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Consumers, policy makers, and business decision makers are increasingly 
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programs could address some of these problems. This study builds a three-sector 
partial equilibrium model to analyze the distributional effects of implementing a 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we study the economic impact of a voluntary food product 
certification-program in the U.S. pork sector. The subject matter is pertinent not only 
because of increasing total market sales, but also because of rising consumer concerns 
about food product quality and producer concerns about imperfect competition. U.S. 
consumers spend approximately ten percent of their disposable income on food products 
and meat products are the largest category. The market for meat and poultry is in excess 
of 20 billion dollars and grows by five percent annually (Euro monitor 2004). The market 
is growing because the disposable income of consumers is increasing and fewer families 
have an adult member working in the home. It is thus not surprising to learn that the U.S. 
food firms pursue aggressive product differentiation strategies, by certifying product 
attribute claims and developing products with convenience attributes in an attempt to 
capture a rising share of the consumer dollar.  
Furthermore, food product certification and food safety is a pertinent issue for the 
food industry, policy decision-makers, as well as consumers. For example, concerns 
about obesity and malnutrition, animal welfare, and environmental externalities, have 
influenced production practices and marketing strategies food products (e.g. see Agency 
Group 2002, Esfahani 2003, Halkias 2002, Martin 2004, Vansickle 2004). Despite these 
problems, it is not clear whether according certification standards can enhance 
consumer’s welfare, as it depends on consumer willingness to pay, the product attributes, 
as well as the degree to which consumers are willing to substitute one version of a 
differentiated product for another as relative prices change. Furthermore, the impact of 
certification programs that begin at the farm on the welfare of farmers is ambiguous. The 
intriguing question is whether the program can enhance economic efficiency in a 
marketing environment with imperfect competition and imperfect product 
substitutability. Although these costs and benefits are hypothesized, previous studies do 
shed light on some of these issues. Golan et al (2001) gives an in-dept overview of 
current labeling schemes and claim that “labeling may be one of the best tools for 
increasing the match between preferences and purchases” (2001: p.147). Moreover, they 
also note that one of the producer benefits of the program is market access for involved  3  
producers (2001: p.162). Marette et al (1999), and Crespi and Marette (2001 and 2002), 
use the Mussa and Rosen vertical product differentiation model (1978) to analyze a 
generalized food certification protocol in an imperfectly competitive industry. The model 
assumes that consumers strictly prefer the certified product, and that only a few firms can 
produce the certified product. While the policy implications from this model are rather 
straightforward, the behavioral assumptions built in the model are important drivers of 
these results. For example, Lutz (1997, 2000) and Nilsson (2002), note that the functional 
forms of demand, cost of production, but also the type of competitive behavior often 
drives the results in stylized vertical differentiation models. Antle (1999) argues that 
consumer preferences are heterogeneous, not all of them will strictly prefer the certified 
product, and that the cost of certification is often unknown.  
In this paper, we develop a conceptual model of a certification scheme in the U.S. 
pork sector that relaxes the restrictive assumptions discussed above on consumer and 
producer behavior. The conceptual model allows for imperfect competition in multiple 
stages of the value chain, as well as imperfect substitutability in demand. The 
imperfection in product substitutability rests upon the notion that consumers are 
heterogeneous and demand for the non-certified product may not cease to exist in a post 
certification era.  
The objective of this study is to analyze the economic impacts of implementing a 
certification protocol in the pork sector. We first build a conceptual model of a 
certification program in the value chain that encompasses heterogeneity in consumer and 
producer behavior. Second, we derive and interpret the optimal decision rules and 
comparative statics analytically for the general model. Third, we parameterize the model 
in order to quantify the potential economic impact of a certification program in the U.S. 
pork sector.  
Conceptual Model 
Figure 1 presents the economic unit of analysis. The upstream suppliers are the 
live animal farmers, and the downstream suppliers are the packer, the processor, and the 
retailing firm, which in turn supplies the final product to the consumer. A certification 
program can control a particular product attribute or the processes by which the product 
passes through the marketing channel. The program may for example regulate, or prohibit  4  
the usage of antibiotics, growth-promoting hormones, feed rations, environmental 
compliance, animal treatment in production, slaughtering practices, as well as the retail-
shelf location. The consumer can buy the product Qv or Qy, where Qv is the certified pork 
product, and Qy the uncertified or conventional hog product. The certified input quantity 
is denoted as Qz, whereas the uncertified or conventional unit is denoted as Qxk. Other 
than being certified or conventionally produced, the products are homogeneous in 
characteristics space.  
The downstream supplier can use choose between certified and conventional 
inputs to produce one unit of conventional goods. For notational convenience, the 
quantity of certified inputs that are allocated into the conventional process is denoted as 
Qzk. Thus, both Qzk and Qxk are perfect substitutes in producing the conventional 
consumer good as indicated by the dashed arrow in Figure 1.  
On the other hand, if the upstream firm’s conventional output, Qxk, were a perfect 
substitute in the intermediary firm’s certified process, the downstream firm’s marketing 
decision would closely resemble that of a Leontief technology, e.g. identical to that of 
Schroeter and Azzam (1990) and Hyde and Perloff (1998). Schroeter and Azzam (1990) 
and Hyde and Perloff (1998) derived the optimality conditions for a multi species meat 
provider to estimate the degree of oligopsony and oligopoly power. These two studies 
rely on rather strong assumptions about consumer and producer behavior. First, the 
downstream supplier can perfectly substitute across the products. Second, the marginal 
cost of processing is constant and independent of the production level of the other 
species.  
Continuing, the consumers are divided into three broadly defined categories. For 
reasons discussed below, type LOW prefers good D; type HIGH prefers only good C, 
whereas type IND is indifferent between the two products. The model of demand thus is a 
mix of a vertical and horizontal differentiation model. Gabszewicz and Thisse define 
vertical product differentiation as “two variants are vertically differentiated whenever, 
sold at the same price, all consumers purchase the same variant” (p.283). Conversely, 
horizontally differentiated products may be preferred by some consumers, but not all. 
Martin, Petiz and Canoy, and Liu and Serfes (2004) present demand models that 
encompass the economic space between perfect horizontal and vertical differentiation.  5  
The spirit of this study is to allow for demand that reflects the notion of heterogeneous 
preferences, and thus it is suitable to use a demand construct that is not a strict vertical or 
horizontal demand structure.  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the U.S. Pork Value Chain. 
 
Consumers with a higher willingness to pay (HIGH) may have a higher income, 
exhibit higher degrees of risk aversion, preferences for product attributes etc., than the 
IND and LOW segments. Furthermore, consumers with low willingness to pay may not 
value product attributes at all, but rather choose to purchase the product with the lowest 
price. The middle segment, however, are both price and product characteristic sensitive. 
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That is to say, the IND segment would purchase product Qv if the combination of the 
number of product characteristics and the price tag would yield a higher level of utility 
than the Qy product. 
The market in figure 1 can encompass different economic behavior between the 
agents, such as perfect competition, Cournot or Bertrand, Stackelberg or by overtly 
colluding in prices, market shares, or quantities. The novelty of this model is that it can 
describe different types of strategic behavior at several stages of the value added chain. 
For now, it is assumed that the upstream firms (farms) and the consumers act as price 
takers, whereas the downstream firm (processor-retailer) has some degree of market 
power. 
Analytical Model 
This section presents an analytical model that can encompass imperfect 
competition, as well as imperfect product substitutability at both the upstream and the 
consumer end markets. Upstream firms act as price takers and have a linear aggregate 
inverse supply for conventional and certified products, 
X Z Z Z
Z X X X
dQ bQ a P
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+ + =
+ + =
, where ax, az, b, d> 0, and b
2 > d
2,    (1) 
where  Px and Pz is the aggregate supply of conventional and certified products, 
respectively. The parameters ax and az are the supply intercepts, b the own price supply 
effect, and d the cross price supply effect. The cost of the certification program for the 
upstream suppliers can potentially be treated as a fixed cost and buried in the intercept az 
so, ax ≤  az. Note that although the quantity coefficients are equal for both products, does 
not imply that the flexibilities are identical, i.e. the inverse of the price elasticities. recall 
that the flexibilities depend also on the price quantity ratio for each good.   
The two downstream suppliers have market power in both the upstream and the 
consumer end markets. The firms are symmetric with constant returns to scale technology 
and so the cost of production is normalized to zero. The cost of certification is also 
normalized to zero. There are no binding capacity constraints in production, and thus an 
increase of certified production does not decrease the uncertified production. It is crucial 
to note that the firms can become potential multiproduct suppliers: this decision is  7  
endogenized, rather than set exogenously as in Marette et al (1999), and Crespi and 
Marette (2001 and 2002).  
Consumers are price-takers and perceive the certified and uncertified products as 
imperfect substitutes. They have an aggregate symmetric linear inverse demand for the 
certified and conventional goods, 
Y Y Y Y
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where Pv is the price for the certified good, Py the price for the conventional good, αv and 
αy the overall willingness to pay for the certified and conventional product respectively. 
The marginal effects on quantities β and γ are assumed to be equal for both inverse 
demands, where β is the own price effect, and γ the cross-price effect. As with the 
aggregate supply relationship, the own price effect has to dominate the cross-price effect. 
The linear form of demand can be seen as a first order approximation to any true 
underlying aggregate long run demand function. Because the focus of this paper is to 
study the ex-ante and the ex-post long run equilibrium situation, this assumption comes at 
a relatively low cost.  
The duopolistic firms have market power in both the input as well as the output 
markets, here referred to as bi-lateral market power. The firms play a myopic static Nash-
Cournot game by maximizing profits with respect to the two strategic variables 
conventional and certified quantities (the technology in this study is not specified to 
allow a substitution of the certified good with conventional, however, preliminary 
findings indicate that this omission is not very costly).  
The Nash assumption implies that the firm has no incentive to deviate from their 
strategy, and thus has zero conjectures with respect to the other firm’s output choice. 
Furthermore, it is also assumed that the cross-good conjectures are zero, i.e. changes in 
output levels in other markets do not have an impact on the current output level.  
For notational convenience, the (first) firm’s quantities are qz,1, which is the 
certified input marketed in the certified market, and qx,1, the conventional good. Because 
there are two symmetric firms in the market, it suffices to characterize the first firm’s 
optimization problem.  
The firm’s maximization problem is,  8  
Max  1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , z Z x X x Y z V q P q P q P q P − − + = π  w.r.t. qx,1 , qz,1     (3) 
The (first) firm’s first order conditions are 
∂ π1/∂ qx,1 = -γqz,1 - βqx,1 + αy - β (qx,1+qx,2) - γ(qz,1+qz,2) + dqz,1 - bqx,1  -ax - b (qx,1+qx,2) 
- d (qz,1+qz,2) = 0 ,         ( 4 )  
and 
∂ π1/∂ qz,1 = -βqz,1 + αv - β(qz,1+qz,2) – γ(qx,1+qx,2) – γ qx,1 - b qz,1- az - b(qz,1+qz,2) + 
d(qx,1+qx,2) - d qx,1 =   0 .        ( 5 )  
It is assumed that the optimal solution is in the interior part of R
++2. 
Consequently, the duopolies buy 
* * * 2 X X X q q n Q ⋅ = ⋅ =  units of the conventional products, 
and 
* * * 2 Z Z Z q q n Q ⋅ = ⋅ =  units of the certified products. The duopolies provides 
* * * 2 V V V q q n Q ⋅ = ⋅ =  and 
* * * 2 Y Y Y q q n Q ⋅ = ⋅ =  units of the certified and uncertified good, 
respectively. Furthermore, we note that the optimal output levels can be solved in terms 
of the demand and supply parameters, and it is possible to calculate equilibrium prices 
and outputs, with and without certification. Thus, the equilibrium firm-level quantities 
are, 
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where the denominator is  () ()
2 2 d b D + − + ≡ γ β  and it is always positive since β > γ and 
b > d. 
The firm’s second order conditions are  9  
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and for profit maximization, the Hessian must be negative definite, which implies that 
|H1| <0 and |H2|>0 (Novshek, 1993). The first minor, H1, is negative because β and b are 
always positive. The second minor, H2, is always positive because bβ>γd. Consequently, 
the negative definiteness of the matrix implies that the profit function is strictly concave 
and there is a unique global maximum for this problem.  
However, although the Hessian matrix is negative definite, the optimal solution 
may not lie in the economic relevant region, i.e. the optimum might lie in the negative 
real domain. For an interior solution with strictly positive output the gradient vectors of 
the profit function must be positive around the borders, the first order conditions are 
evaluated at their optimal level, and an interior real positive solution implies that 
0 , 0
0 , 0 , 0 0 , 0 > ∇ > ∇
≠ = = = ≠ z z x z x k F F . If the gradients are negative at their border, it implies 
that profit decreases if the firm increases production. Thus, the firm maximizes its profit 
by choosing not to produce that output and a non-interior solution is optimal. For the first 
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Hence, the sign of the gradients depend on the endogenous output levels. 
Although the profit function has a mathematically correct unique global maximum, the 
economic optimum may be a non-interior solution.  
The economic insight offered by these systems of equations may have strong 
economic implications, both at a managerial firm level perspective, as well as from a 
policy perspective. In particular, situations can arise in which a single product firm does 
not wish to become multiproduct provider, despite the fact that it has market power. 
Thus, the firm’s decision to become a multiproduct provider depends on equilibrium 
output, prices, and demand and supply characteristics. Previous literature might have  10 
missed this point when studying the behavior of multiproduct oligopolies that have 
market power only in one market (input or output), whereas this study assumes market 
power in potentially both. Shaked and Sutton (1982) were amongst the first to note this 
particular peculiarity in imperfectly competitive industries, when they studied strategic 
interactions between an incumbent firm and an entrant. Marette et al (1999), however, 
does not consider endogenizing the firm’s decision to become a certified provider. 
Thus, from a policy standpoint, it is warranted to consider how firms react to 
changes in demand and/or supply due to the implementation of a certification scheme. If 
the firms have market power, an implementation of a certification scheme or introduction 
of a new product line, may actually crowd out the old products. On the other hand, there 
may also be a situation in which a public initiative to implement a voluntary certification 
system is not adopted by the industry stakeholders: it may not be in the best interests of 
the industry stakeholders to implement a certified product line, if the firms maintain 
higher profit by not producing the certified product. Alternatively, substitution or 
complementary relationships in demand may provide opportunities to further exploit 
market power in one or both markets. 
Comparative Statics 
If an economically interesting interior solution to the problem exists, it is possible 
to analyze how a change in the demand and supply parameters affects the equilibrium 
output levels. The comparative static exercise in this problem is slightly complex due to 
the imperfect competition and imperfect substitutability assumptions.  
The welfare impact of the differentiation program in an imperfectly versus 
perfectly competitive market can be potentially vastly different. Bulow et al (1985), 
Quirmbach (1988), and Caputo (1996 and 1998) provide insight on these complexities. 
Bulow et al study how the competitive behavior between suppliers changes when the 
option arises to serve two independent markets. They coin the terms strategic substitutes 
and strategic complements, and show that depending on how the firm’s perception of 
competition determines the equilibrium when accessing a new market. They show that 
the producer’s profit, as well as consumers’ surplus may decrease when firms are 
segmenting the markets. Quirmbach (1988) analyzes an oligopolistic market and shows 
that when there is a positive demand shift, the effects on prices and quantities are  11 
ambiguous. Essentially, the effect on production level and prices of a positive demand 
shift depends on the demand and supply elasticities, firm conjectures, and the 
comparative advantage compared to international markets. Caputo’s framework, 
furthermore, has the potential to address both Bulow et al and Quirmbach problem. By 
approaching the optimality conditions of an imperfectly competitive industry via the 
Primal-Dual approach (Silberberg 1974), Caputo derives the optimal response by each 
firm. In our model, however, we extend this perspective further by allowing for imperfect 
substitutability as well as market power at multiple stages.  
With a little abuse of notation, the following condition must hold at an optimum 
J3X
*
1 + 3B1 = 0,           ( 1 3 )  
where J is the Jacobean matrix of the first order conditions (e.g. the Hessian), x* are the 
endogenously optimized output variables, and finally B the total differential of exogenous 
demand and supply parameters. The latter matrix is 
- qz,1dγ - qx,1dβ + dαy  - (qx,1+qx,2)dβ - (qz,1+qz,2)dγ + qz,1dd   - qx,1 d b - dax- 
(qx,1+qx,2)db  - (qz,1+qz,2)dd, 
B = -qz,1dβ+ dαv - (qz,1+qz,2)dβ – (qx,1+qx,2)dγ –qx,1dγ - qz,1db - daz - (qz,1+qz,2)db - 
(qx,1+qx,2)dd - qx,1dd.        (14) 
where d is the differential operator.  
Consequently, the system of equations to consider is  
X* = - J
-1B.          ( 1 5 )  
where the vector -J
-1B predicts the optimal changes in output quantities of conventional, 
certified used in conventional markets, and certified products marketed in the certified 
markets, respectively, as demand and supply parameters changes. Moreover, imposing 
symmetry implies that the impact on the endogenous variables of changes in the 
exogenous parameters for both firms is identical.   
We can now evaluate how an increase in αv, ceteris paribus, affects the optimal 





































,     (16)  12 
The effect of an increase in consumer willingness to pay for the certified increase 
the certified output increases the certified output, but has an ambiguous impact on the 
conventional production. Conventional output increases if d > γ. The magnitude of the 
quantity and price changes depends on values of the demand parameters.  
Because of symmetry restrictions, the effects of changing the consumer 




































.      (17) 
That is, the conventional output increases for a positive demand shock, but the effect is 
ambiguous for certified good production. The certified output level increases if γ < d.  
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,      ( 1 8 )  
The effect on conventional production is positive if  () () β γ + > − b x,1 z,1 q d q , and also 
positive for certified production if the converse holds, i.e.  () () β γ + > − b z,1 x,1 q d q . 
The last parameter in the demand equation is γ, which indicates how differentiated 
the products are in the eyes of the consumers. As the two product lines become more 
homogeneous in the eyes of the consumer, the parameter γ increases (Shy, 1993). Thus, 
the J





































,   (19) 
and the firm’s conventional output increases if  () () β γ + > − b z,1 x,1 q d q , and the certified 
output increases if  () () β γ + > − b x,1 z,1 q d q . 
It is now appropriate to consider exogenous shifts in the supply curve. Similar to 
changes in demand intercepts, the effects of shifting the supply curves have the same  13 
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Thus, if the conventional supply shifts upwards, the firm output decreases. 
However, for () 0 d > − γ , the certified output is increasing. A positive shock in the 





































,       ( 2 1 )  
the output effects of changing the certified intercept are in opposition to that of changes 
in the conventional supply intercept.  
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.      ( 2 2 )  
Thus, the impact of changes in the supply slope coefficient have the same impact 
on firm output levels, as changes in the demand slope. The last case to consider is a 







































,   (23) 
Conventional output increases if  () () β γ + − > − b d z,1 x,1 q q , and certified output 
increases if the converse holds, i.e.  () () β γ + − > − b d x,1 z,1 q q . 
Empirical Application  
Agribusinesses in the U.S. pork sector are implementing a variety of certification 
schemes. At the upstream live-animal stages, the National Pork Board has instituted  14 
voluntary programs such as the Pork Quality Assurance program (PQA), as well as the 
Swine Welfare Assurance Program (SWAP). The PQA was instituted in 1989 to address 
proper antibiotic use on farms. SWAP started in 2003 as an effort to guarantee ethical 
live animal treatment on farms and in slaughter plants. However, the compelling question 
is whether NPB’s SWAP has the potential to guarantee quality for animal-welfare 
concerned consumers and add value for compliant farmers. 
At the downstream levels, the National Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR), 
and the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) launched the Animal Welfare Audit Program 
(AWAP) in 2003 to meet the public concerns about the housing and treatment of animals 
on farms and in slaughter plants. Individual food service providers are responding to 
animal welfare issues, and to concerns about consumer nutrition. In the summer of 2003, 
the McDonald’s Corporation launched both an antibiotics policy as well as a new menu 
with an expanded variety of healthy meal choices for customers. The objective of the 
antibiotics policy is to prevent development of antibiotic resistant bacteria strains (Mc 
Donald’s 2003). The objective of the new menu is to attract health conscious consumers 
and reduce the risk of losing their patronage as well as that of those who might 
accompany them to a meal. An important issue to address is how programs like these 
affect upstream suppliers’ and consumers’ welfare. The intriguing question is if these 
aforementioned programs can enhance the downstream suppliers’ potential for market 
power, or provide a source for alleviating market power. 
Public policy makers have also taken an active interest in implementing 
certification programs. Golan et al (2001) discussed the public role of creating initiatives 
and forming rules for food-certification program rules in the U.S. food chain. Moreover, 
the USDA agencies currently provide oversight for the National Organic Program (NOP), 
the Process Verification Programs (PVP), and the Country of Origin Labeling Act 
(COOL). The NOP sets the standards for organic food products, and uses an independent 
auditor to certify compliance with the NOP guidelines. Compliance with the PVP’s also 
uses third party auditors. COOL is a mandatory labeling scheme to inform the consumer 
about country of origin of food commodities such as meat, fish, fresh fruit, vegetables, 
and peanuts among others. Consequently, from a normative perspective the problem is to 
design a certification program that can enhance the overall economic efficiency.  15 
The previously presented model may be useful in providing some quantitative 
answers to the aforementioned issues. As this study is similar to a counterfactual study, it 
imposes a few limitations in the empirical data application (e.g. see discussion in Hall 
2003 and references therein). Other than current marketing information, there is no value 
chain wide certification program implemented for pork products in the U.S. for which 
data exists. Consequently, this study focuses on two reference points: an ex-ante and an 
ex-post certification situation, where both situations refer to long-run equilibrium 
conditions. The comparative analysis can yield insight into how the ex-post equilibrium 
adjusts due to changes in demand substitutability and the cost structures of firms. 
Thus, in addressing these issues, a number of empirical assumptions are invoked. 
The first assumption concerns the relationship between upstream and downstream 
suppliers in the industry. This model assumes that upstream and downstream suppliers 
are separate entities. Thus, this approach ignores issues related to completely vertically 
integrated meat packing plants, as well as contracting and captive supplies. In 
forthcoming research, this assumption will be relaxed, to account for varying degree of 
contracting relationship in the pork value chain. According to GIPSA Packers and 
Stockyards Statistical Report, the four firm hog-slaughter industry concentration ratio is 
82 percent (2001). The USDA Agricultural Outlook Statistical Indicator database has 
information about current production levels and prices, which are displayed in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1. Base Line Data (in Live Weight Equivalent). 
Quantity   C4  Farm Gate Price   RetailPrice 
 17.64   14.43   0.48   1.44  




    
Business and Company Resource Center reports that Tyson, ConAgra, Cargill, 
and Smithfield are the industry leaders in the U.S. meat packing industry (note that these 
firms are not only multi-specie, but also provide an array of other food products, 
marketed under national brands). These four firms have a number of desirable traits. 
First, the firms have a national scope, and as such are suitable firms that could potentially 
implement a food system wide certification scheme. Second, the four largest firms carry 
brands that are recognized by the consumers, who are wiling to pay a premium for these  16 
products. Lusk, Nilsson, and Foster (2004) found that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for nationally branded pork products over store branded and no branded pork 
products. The model makes three further assumptions regarding the downstream 
supplier’s behavior: (a) that the firms are symmetric; (b) the firms have market power at 
the consumer stages; (c) the firms have market power at the upstream stages. A 
forthcoming study will analyze the impact on the results from these assumptions. 
By using the optimality conditions from the analytical model, it is possible to 
solve for equilibrium prices and quantities ex-ante and ex post certification era. The ex-
ante equilibrium rates are displayed in Table 1, and are intended to reflect current 
economic situation in the U.S. pork value chain. Consequently, the exogenous parameters 
in this calibration exercise are market shares, prices, and quantities. Note that all prices 
are measured in live weight pounds (to get to retail weight, divide by 1.869). The 
endogenous parameters are thus the structural parameters in demand and supply, and 
subsequently the demand and supply elasticities.  
Table 2. The Ex-Ante Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition in the Upstream and Consumer 
Market. 
  Total Output  Farm price  Retail price  Firm Output  Profit  Profit (%) 
  11.41   0.51   1.48   2.85  2.77   143 
Units  M Lbs  $/lbs  $/lbs  M Lbs  M$  sales value 
The profit rate is somewhat more arbitrarily though. Since the cost of production 
is normalized to zero, other input costs are forgone in the analysis, so this figure 
represents only a partial economic rent.  
In this situation, the downstream supplier buys at the elastic portion of the input 
supply η ≈  1.1, and markets the product at the inelastic portion of the consumer demand 
curve, ε≈  .43. Recall that the inverse schedules yield flexibilities, so we need to invert the 
matrix to obtain the direct elasticities (Hoeck, 1967).The supply price elasticity is 
reasonable since production technology is variable in the long-run. The demand price 
elasticity, however, is somewhat in contrast to the classical textbook example of 
monopoly pricing, where the firm prices at the elastic portion of the demand curve. This 
result may arise in part because the functional form of demand wherein there is no 
substitution to other food products taking place.  
In the case where the firm has market power in the output markets only, holding 
farm price constant, increase firm output and consequently decrease price, and profits.  17 
The scenario with imperfect competition only at the consumer markets is shown in the 
Table 3 below. 
Table 3. Ex-Ante Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition in the Consumer Market only. 
  Total Output  Farm price  Retail price  Firm Output  Profit  Profit (%) 
  11.72   0.51   1.39   2.93   2.57   122 
Units  M Lbs  $/lbs  $/lbs  M Lbs  M$  sales value 
Here, the supply price elasticity is lowered slightly due to increased total 
production, η≈  1.0, whereas the demand elasticity decreases, ε≈  .39. Because the supplier 
cannot suppress market power in the input stages, the output level increase, and prices 
decrease, which decrease the profit rates by nearly 20 percent units. 
In the case where a pork certification program is certified, the certified live animal 
supply is created by developing a supply curve that lies slightly above the conventional 
supply curve. The cost of supplying certified live animals is hypothesized to exceed that 
of the conventional. Here, the certified supply intercept shifts up by forty percent units, 
so that ceteris paribus, the cost of supplying certified products exceeds the conventional 
production costs by forty percents. The demand is shifted upwards by two percent units. 
That is at identical consumption levels, the certified pork retail price exceeds the 
conventional retail price by two percent. Although these shifts are symbolic, these shifts 
presents cases in which there is a sustainable certified hog and pork product market. Due 
to the high nonlinearity in the first order conditions, there is somewhat of a challenge in 
finding a numerical equilibrium where the firms produce both quantities as well as obtain 
positive profits. Still, although the optimality conditions come from a strictly convex 
programming problem, the optimal solution can lie in the negative variable quadrant. The 
ex-post equilibrium is given Table 4 below.  
Table 4. Ex-Post Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition in the Upstream and Consumer Market. 
   Total Output    Farm 
price  
 Retail price    Firm Output    Profit    Profit (%)  
 Certified   9.58  0.60  1.57  2.40  2.31  151 
 Conventional   7.45  0.54  1.49  1.86  1.77  142 
 Total   17.03  0.57*  1.53*  4.26  4.08  147* 
 Unit   M Lbs  $/lbs  $/lbs  M Lbs  M$  of sales value 
* = weighted 
average 
         
Here we note that radical changes in the value chain occurred. Total demand has 
increased, but this has occurred at decreased demand for conventional products. With  18 
decreased conventional output, the price has increased compared to the ex-ante scenario. 
However, the prices are and contribution margin are higher for the certified product. 
The weighted average farm (upstream) price is higher than the ex-ante 
conventional price but lower at the consumer-end market. That is, an analysis of 
aggregate data could wrongfully indicate that the consumer is worse off, because of the 
price increase. However, taking into account the new product introduction, there are 
consumers who demand the certified product. Thus, this example illustrates that 
considering the certified product in the same bundle as the conventional product group 
may overstate, or understate the true welfare changes.  
The new product introduction has increased demand price elasticities sharply: the 
demand own price elasticities are high, ε≈  8-10. There is also an increase in the supply 
elasticities, which have increased by a magnitude of two. 
With a perfectly competitive live animal market, the economic impact of the 
certification is displayed below.  
Table 5. Ex-Post Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition in the Consumer Market. 
   Total Output    Farm 
price  
 Retail price    Firm Output    Profit    Profit (%)  
 Certified   10.27 0.60 1.46  2.57  2.21  1.26 
 Conventional   7.28 0.54  1.39 1.82  1.55  1.19 
 Total   17.56 0.58 1.43  4.39  3.76  1.23 
 Unit   M Lbs  $/lbs  $/lbs  M Lbs  M$  of sales value 
* = weighted 
average 
         
As with the previous scenario, total output increases and so does the farm prices. 
The retail price for conventional, however, is unchanged at 1.39 per live weight pound. 
Moreover, the composition of the firm’s profit is similar to the previous case in which the 
contribution margin is higher for the certified commodity. Note also that the average 
weighted prices have increased due to the product introduction.  
There are two rather stark shortcomings with this empirical application. First, the 
model does not currently incorporate the economic impact of vertically aligned hog 
processors that do not acquire supply of live animals through open market transactions. 
Nevertheless, the analytical model could be extended in a future study to incorporate the 
aspects of multiple stage ownership in the hog value chain. Second, a slight perturbation 
of the numerically calibrated model produces ex-post results that are challenging to 
interpret. For example, in the ex-post situation, the resulting own price demand  19 
elasticities are high, ε ≈  10, with lower valued cross price elasticities. The supply price 
elasticities are elastic, but smaller in magnitude than the demand elasticities, |η| ≈  2. The 
supply cross price elasticities is positive, however, indicating that the products are 
aggregate complements. The issue with the elasticities reveals a more challenging 
problem with the numerical optimization model. The optimization problem is highly 
nonlinear in the demand and supply parameters, and because the elasticities are 
endogenous, and only prices and quantities exogenously given, the ex ante calibration 
may actually be an unstable saddle point in the parameter space and with small 
perturbations thereof may result in negative optimal quantities. Thus, it is warranted to 
extend the analysis by constraining the model to yield only economically tractable 
results.  
Nevertheless, this exercise has proven to be a valuable exercise on two counts. 
First, there seems to be some support of the fact that the demand for the conventional 
product will not be discontinued despite the introduction of the certified product. 
Although the demand and supply functions are sensitive for the chosen parameter values, 
there is still confidence that the conventional product is not automatically discontinued. 
Second, adverse price movements in the conventional market are likely to occur. 
Consequently, aggregate price indices may actually misrepresent the welfare impact on 
consumers and producers. Although this study does not provide estimate welfare changes 
for consumers and producers, there are some indications that the certification scheme 
provides a better match between consumer preferences and product attributes.   20 
 
Conclusions 
This study attempted to provide an economic model that could potentially 
quantify the economic distributional impact of a certification program in the U.S. pork 
value chain. There are two rather stark conclusions from this study, which all have 
important implications for both agribusinesses and policy markets. 
The first conclusion is that the economic effects of a certification program depend 
vastly on assumptions regarding consumer and producer behavior. If the firm’s decision 
to become multiproduct suppliers are endogenized, rather than exogenously given, 
market environments may arise in which the suppliers do not certify their product despite 
the fact that the certified consumer end demand exists. Although the analytical model is a 
strict convex programming problem, corner solutions are still present since the solutions 
can lie in negative variable quadrants. Hence, endogenizing the product choice can yield 
situations that are in sharp contrast to previous studies, where the firm’s quality choice is 
given exogenously (e.g. see Marette et al). Thus, from a policy perspective, the absence 
of a certified product may indicate presence of market power, as well as situations in 
which the potential certified live animal supply curve is located well above the 
conventional supply curve, or that there is weak consumer willingness to pay for certified 
pork products. Furthermore, if there are consumers who are willing to consume the 
uncertified product in an ex post certification era, the certified and conventional products 
cannot be considered as perfect substitutes.  
Secondly, certification in imperfectly competitive industries may actually lessen 
competition if firms use the certification program as a mean to differentiate the product 
lines. In our analytical model, we showed that when the differentiation parameter, γ, 
increases, there is an unequal effect the markets: thus there are situations in which an 
increase of the differentiation parameter actually lowers quantities and increases the 
market prices. Moreover, our numerical model showed that in the ex post scenario, the 
firm with no market power at the upstream stages have higher equilibrium output levels 
than the firm with double market power.   
 
   21 
Hitherto, the economic impact of a certification scheme across the whole value 
chain remains somewhat unclear. For the farmer the certification program may be a 
profitable strategy that ensures market access, alleviates market power, and expands the 
consumer-end market. For the packer-retailer the program may be a profitable strategy 
that matches heterogeneous consumer demand preferences with extensive certified and 
conventional product diversification. Thus, stakeholders in the value chain are 
implementing food certification programs to meet consumers concerns about product and 
process control, such as animal welfare and antibiotic usage. Downstream suppliers 
provide product guarantees and expand the product lines to attract bundles of consumers 
that would otherwise not patronize their product line. Hence, by supplying products with 
different product attributes, suppliers differentiate among different consumers on basis of 
their willingness to pay for product attributes while consumers, in aggregate, benefit from 
greater choice.   22 
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